Kleeman v. Rheingold: There Are No Small Mistakes - A Process Server\u27s Negligence Leads to the Creation of a Nondelegable Duty by Goldstein, Barbara S.
Pace Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 3 Spring 1995 Article 4
April 1995
Kleeman v. Rheingold: There Are No Small
Mistakes - A Process Server's Negligence Leads to
the Creation of a Nondelegable Duty
Barbara S. Goldstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara S. Goldstein, Kleeman v. Rheingold: There Are No Small Mistakes - A Process Server's Negligence
Leads to the Creation of a Nondelegable Duty, 15 Pace L. Rev. 871 (1995)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/4
Note
Kleeman v. Rheingold: There Are No
Small Mistakes-A Process
Server's Negligence Leads to the
Creation of a Nondelegable Duty
I. Introduction
Talk about having a bad day! Have you ever asked some-
one to give another person a message? The person you were
trying to contact probably got the message. Well, not everyone
is so lucky. In one recent instance, the intended recipient
claimed not to get the message. The sender did not make a fed-
eral case of it, but she took it to the highest court of the state.
Kleeman v. Rheingold' should have been a medical mal-
practice suit. Unfortunately, the process server mistakenly
served the papers on the physician's secretary rather than the
physician himself.2 The doctor raised the affirmative defense of
lack of jurisdiction and the case was dismissed.3 When Mrs.
Kleeman attempted to have the papers served on the doctor
again, the statute of limitations had run and the medical mal-
l. 81 N.Y.2d 270, 614 N.E.2d 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1993).
2. Id. at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 714, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 151. Although the doctor
received actual notice of the claim, under New York's strict construction of the
service rules, there was improper service and, therefore, no jurisdiction. See Mac-
chia v. Russo, 67 N.Y.2d 592, 595, 496 N.E.2d 680, 682, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593
(1986) ("Notice received by means other than those authorized by statute does not
bring a defendant within the jurisdiction of the court.") (citations omitted). "The
personal delivery contemplated by CPLR § 308(1)... can ordinarily be satisfied
only by handing the summons to the defendant himself." OscAR G. CHASE & RoB-
ERT A. BARKER, CML LITIGATION IN NEW YORK 185 (2d ed. 1990).
3. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 148 Misc. 2d 853, 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
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practice suit was barred. Mrs. Kleeman, having been deprived
of her remedy, brought a second suit for legal malpractice
against the law firm she had hired to pursue the medical mal-
practice claim. 5
It is Mrs. Kleeman's second suit that is the focus of this
Note. The issue raised before the New York Court of Appeals
was whether the attorney could be held liable for the negligence
of the process server he hired.6 The court answered this ques-
tion affirmatively by creating a new nondelegable duty. Mrs.
Kleeman's attorney was held liable because he had the respon-
sibility of insuring proper service of process. 7 Part II of this
Note lays a foundation for the Court of Appeals' decision
through an exploration of the background of the law of vicarious
liability and its numerous exceptions. The Kleeman case is dis-
cussed in depth in Part III, including the facts, the procedural
history, and the divided opinion of the New York Court of Ap-
peals. Next, Part IV analyzes and critiques the court's opinion.
It also provides a suggestion of how the court could have more
appropriately decided the case by focusing on more narrow
grounds. The Note concludes with an evaluation of probable fu-
ture trends regarding vicarious liability and service of process
in New York.
II. Background
A. Vicarious Liability
Generally, one is liable only for his own acts of negligence.8
An exception to the general rule is "vicarious liability,"9 which
4. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 713, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The
statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions is two years and six months.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 214-a (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1995). Mrs. Kleeman also
sued the hospital. That case went to trial resulting in a verdict for the defendant.
Kleeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
5. Kleeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
6. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 713-14, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 150-51.
7. Id. at 275, 614 N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
8. Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (Ct. App. 1975)
(explaining that normally liability follows fault); Feliberty v. Damon, 72 N.Y.2d
112, 117, 527 N.E.2d 261, 263, 531 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (1988); Kavanaugh v. Nuss-
baum, 71 N.Y.2d 535, 546, 523 N.E.2d 284, 287,528 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (1988) (Liabil-
ity in negligence generally rests on a defendant's own fault.").
9. Vicarious liability is the imposition of liability on one person for the conduct
of another based on the relationship between the two persons. BLAck's LAw Dic-
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imputes negligence to another because of the relationship be-
tween the two individuals.'0 Vicarious liability was recognized
by the New York Court of Appeals as early as 1871 in Higgins v.
Watervliet Turnpike Co." In Higgins, a train conductor ex-
pelled a passenger from a train for misconduct. 12 The conductor
produced evidence that the passenger had been noisy and disor-
derly and refused to obey the "reasonable directions of the con-
ductor."' 3 According to the plaintiff, unnecessary force was used
in ejecting him and he suffered injury as a result. 4 The court
imputed the act of the conductor to the railroad, thereby hold-
ing the railroad liable because it could not act except through its
agents and employees.' 5 Ejecting passengers who misbehaved
was completely within the authority of the conductor.'6 Acting
this way, the conductor was the railroad's agent. The decision
to impose vicarious liability was founded on public policy and
convenience.' 7 The court noted: "[e]very person is bound to use
due care in the conduct of his business. If the business is com-
mitted to an agent or servant, the obligation is not changed."'8
An additional justification for imputing negligence from the
conductor-agent to the railroad-principal is that the negligence
of the agent is the negligence of the principal.' 9 Therefore, the
court found that the principal is justly liable.20
TIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990). A common example is that of an employer being held
liable for the acts of an employee. Id.
10. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69,
at 499 (5th ed. 1984). The negligence of A is to be charged against B although B
played no part in A's conduct. Id.
11. 46 N.Y. 23 (1871).
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 25-26.
16. Id. at 26. Even if the conductor's conduct was not authorized, the railroad
would be liable because "t]he master's liability for the negligence or tort of his
servant, does not depend upon the existence of an authority to do the particular act
from which the injury resulted." Id.
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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1. Scope of Employment
Respondeat superior 21 is a form of vicarious liability which
applies when an agent acts for the benefit of his principal and
within the scope of his employment. 22 The scope of employment
is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Agency as conduct of
the servant that (a) is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b)
occurs within the authorized time and space limits; and (c) is
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.2 In
order to determine the scope of employment, the court must ex-
amine each situation and the surrounding circumstances.2
Acts that are incidental to authorized conduct are consid-
ered within the scope of employment if they are done to accom-
plish the purpose of the employment. 25 Even an act that is
unauthorized can result in vicarious liability if it is done within
the course of employment. 26 Conduct is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far
beyond the authorized time and space limits or too little actu-
ated to serve the master.27 Generally, control is the determina-
21. Literally, respondeat superior means "[1]et the master answer." BLAcis
LAw DIcTioNARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990). This doctrine means that a master or
principal is liable for the wrongful acts of his servant or agent in some cases. Id.
22. Id. See also Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 220 (1909) (stat-
ing that one who employs a servant is answerable to strangers for the negligent
acts of the servant committed within the course of employment).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). See also Di Cosala v.
Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 513 (N.J. 1982); Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 588 P.2d 1271, 1274
(Or. 1978) (defining scope of employment involves a consideration of whether the
act in question is of the kind the employee was hired to perform, whether it oc-
curred within the authorized limits of time and space, and whether it was moti-
vated by a purpose to serve the employer).
24. Chalmers v. Harris Motors, Inc., 179 A.2d 447, 451 (N.H. 1962).
25. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Creekmore, 23 So. 2d 250, 252 (Miss. 1945) (hold-
ing the employer liable because moving a stove was a necessary incident to the
work the employee was doing); Gonzales v. Southwest Sec. & Protection Agency,
Inc., 665 P.2d 810, 811 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (holding the employer liable for acts
naturally incidental to the business, done while engaged upon the master's busi-
ness to further the master's interest).
26. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Paddock, 40 N.E.2d 697, 697-98 (Ind.
1942); Fanciullo v. B. G. & S. Theatre Corp., 8 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Mass. 1937);
Rankin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 23 N.W.2d 676, 677 (Neb. 1946). See also
Thompson v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (D.S.D. 1980) (stating that a
forbidden act may cause the imposition of vicarious liability if it is done within the
scope of employment).
27. RESTATEME-r (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2).
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tive factor in defining the scope of employment. 28 In some cases,
however, courts have used a benefit theory to define scope of
employment. 29
a. Control Theory
A leading New York case on vicarious liability is Lundberg
v. State.30 Lundberg involved a car accident caused by the neg-
ligence of a state employee. 31 The only issue raised on appeal
was whether the negligence of the employee could be imputed to
the state.32 The state employee was driving back to work after a
weekend at home when the accident occurred.33 The Court of
Appeals held that the employee was not acting in the scope of
his employment when he was driving to the worksite because
the employer lacked control over his activity, and that there-
fore, the state was not liable for his negligence.3 Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the court explained that an em-
ployer is liable for the negligence of an employee committed
while the employee is acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.3 5 The court stated that "[a]n employee acts in the scope
of his employment when he is doing something in furtherance of
the duties he owes to his employer and where the employer is,
or could be, exercising some control, directly or indirectly, over
the employer's activities."36 The Lundberg court pointed out
that generally, driving to and from work is not "acting in the
28. Standard Oil Co., 212 U.S. at 222; Becker v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
298 P. 979, 982 (Cal. 1931) (explaining that the true test of the employer-employee
relationship is the right to exercise control); Kersten v. Van Grack, Axelson & Wil-
liamowsky, P.C., 608 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (stating that the
decisive test of whether a master-servant relation exists is whether the employer
has the right to control the manner of doing the work). See infra part IIA.l.a.
29. Ponticas v. KM.S. nvs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (if the em-
ployer benefits from the conduct, he may be held liable). If the employee acts for
the benefit of the employer, he is acting within the scope of employment. Foss v.
Anthony Indus., 189 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1983). See infra part II.A.1.b.
for a discussion of the benefit theory.
30. 25 N.Y.2d 467, 255 N.E.2d 177, 306 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1969).
31. Id. at 469, 255 N.E.2d at 178, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 949. The claimant's hus-
band was killed when his car was struck by an auto owned and operated by an
employee of the State of New York. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 470, 255 N.E.2d at 178, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
34. Id. at 470, 255 N.E.2d at 178-79, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
35. Id. at 470, 255 N.E.2d at 179, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
36. Id.
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scope of. . . employment."37 Because the employer lacked con-
trol over the employee's conduct, the court held there could be
no liability despite the fact that the activity was work-moti-
vated.38 In addition, the court said that the employee was driv-
ing to satisfy a personal desire and not a work obligation so he
was not acting within the scope of his employment. 39
The New York Court of Appeals reinforced the idea that
control determines liability again in 1988 in Kavanaugh v.
Nussbaum, a medical malpractice case.4° The patient in Kava-
naugh was a forty-year-old pregnant woman.41 She went to the
emergency room because of abnormal bleeding and was treated
by the emergency room physician.42 Her regular obstetrician,
who was unavailable, had arranged for a colleague to cover for
him.43 The emergency room physician reported the patient's
condition to the covering doctor who instructed him to send the
patient home." The patient returned to the emergency room
later that night with increased bleeding. 45 At that time she was
treated by her regular obstetrician who delivered her severely
deformed son by Cesarean section.46
A jury returned a verdict against the covering doctor and
the obstetrician.47 The court noted, however, that the only basis
for imposing liability on the obstetrician was vicarious liabil-
ity.48 In determining whether this was an appropriate case to
apply vicarious liability, the court acknowledged "that it was
common practice in the community for sole practitioners to
cover for each other."49 Because the doctors, as sole practition-
ers, are not controlled by the doctors for whom they cover, the
37. Id. at 471, 255 N.E.2d at 179, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 471-72, 255 N.E.2d at 179, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 951. The employer had
gone home to spend the weekend with his family. Id. at 472, 255 N.E.2d at 179,
306 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
40. 71 N.Y.2d 535, 523 N.E.2d 284, 528 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1988).
41. Id. at 542, 523 N.E.2d at 285, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
42. Id. at 543, 523 N.E.2d at 286, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
43. Id. at 542-43, 523 N.E.2d at 285, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
44. Id. at 543, 523 N.E.2d at 285, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
45. Id. at 543, 523 N.E.2d at 285-86, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
46. Id. at 543, 523 N.E.2d at 286, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 10. The Cesarean was per-
formed by her regular doctor. Id.
47. Id. at 543-44, 523 N.E.2d at 286, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
48. Id. at 545, 523 N.E.2d at 287, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
49. Id.
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court held there could be no vicarious liability.5° The court ex-
plained that "[u]nderlying the doctrine of vicarious liability-
the imputation of liability to defendant for another person's
fault, based on defendant's relationship with the wrongdoer-is
the notion of control."51
The reason for imputing negligence is that the employer is
better able to bear the consequences, 5 2 and it encourages the
employer "to act carefully in the selection and supervision of its
employees."53 The court found that vicarious liability in these
situations would discourage doctors from getting full-time cov-
erage for their patients.M Since this is contrary to the public
policy goal of having full medical coverage, the court "decine[d]
to enlarge the doctrine of vicarious liability to reach [this]
situation."55
b. Benefit Theory
Some courts make their decision to impose vicarious liabil-
ity on the employer because of the idea that the employer bene-
fits from the employee's work and, therefore, should be
responsible for any harm the employee causes.56 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota explained this concept in Ponticas v. KM.S.
Investments.5 7 In Ponticas, the jury found the owners and man-
agers of an apartment complex were negligent in their hiring of
a resident manager who sexually assaulted a female tenant.58
The resident manager was hired with little inquiry into his past
and without even a phone call to his references.59 Such an in-
vestigation would have revealed his criminal record for violent
50. Id. at 548-49, 523 N.E.2d at 289, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
51. Id. at 546, 523 N.E.2d at 287-88, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
52. Id. at 546, 523 N.E.2d at 288, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 548, 523 N.E.2d at 289, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 13 (citing Graddy v. New
York Med. College, 19 A.D.2d 426,430, 243 N.Y.S.2d 940,944-45 (1st Dep't 1963)).
55. Id. at 549, 523 N.E.2d at 289, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
56. See Holman v. State, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773, 779 (Ct. App. 1975). The benefit
concept used to be part of the definition of scope of employment. T. BATY, VIcARI-
ous LiLAniLrry 131 (1916). The rule was that "[a]n act done within the scope of
employment is by legal intendment for the benefit of the master...." Id. at 132
(quoting Smith v. Martin, 2 KB. 783 (1911)). For a general discussion of the bene-
fit theory, see id. at 128-45.
57. 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 910. His references were his mother and sister. Id. at 914.
1995] 877
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offenses and his work history.60 It is possible that this informa-
tion would have discouraged the manager of the complex from
hiring this applicant. The rationale for imposing liability on the
employer is that "since the employer receives some benefit, even
if only a potential or indirect benefit,.., there exists a duty on
the employer to exercise reasonable care" in hiring.61 Because
the managers and owners received a benefit from the hire, they
owed the tenants the duty of exercising reasonable care in hir-
ing a resident manager.62
The benefit theory was also explained by a dissenting jus-
tice in Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurol-
ogy, Ltd.63 Justice Peterson of the Minnesota Supreme Court
discussed the two theories of vicarious liability. The first is the
control theory.' The other justification the dissenter noted was
the benefit theory.65 The benefit theory "argues that since the
employer reaps a benefit when the employee acts properly, the
employer should share the cost when he acts improperly."66 Li-
ability is therefore limited to acts that the employee engages in
which could result in a benefit to the employer.67
Thus, vicarious liability is imposed upon the person who is
best able to compensate the injured party. It may be the person
who exercised control over the individual who caused the harm
or, under the benefit theory, the person who benefitted, or could
potentially benefit, from the acts of the tortfeasor. In both in-
stances, liability falls on the party most deserving of the obliga-
tion to compensate the injured party.
B. Independent Contractor Exception
An exception to the rule that an employer is vicariously lia-
ble for the acts of his employers states that an employer is not
liable for the torts of an independent contractor.68 This excep-
60. Id. at 909.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 329 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 313. See supra part IIA.l.a for a discussion of the control theory.
65. Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 314 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 152, 48 N.E.2d 299,
302 (1943); Hermance v. Daddy-O's Restaurant Corp., 159 A.D.2d 924, 925, 553
878 [Vol. 15:871
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tion is based on the lack of control an employer may exercise
over an independent contractor.69 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines an independent contractor as one who "does work
for another under conditions [insufficient] to make him a ser-
vant."70 To determine who is an independent contractor, sev-
eral factors must be considered. Among them are: the extent of
control the master has over the work; whether or not the em-
ployee is engaged in a distinct occupation; the kind of occupa-
tion; the skill required; who supplies the instrumentalities; and
the duration of the employment. 71 Many courts determine who
is an independent contractor by focusing on who retains control
of the performance of the contract.72 One New York court de-
N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (3d Dep't 1990). See also Holman v. State, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773,
779 (Ct. App. 1975); Misiulis v. Milbrand Maintenance Corp., 218 N.W.2d 68, 70
(Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Galentine v. Borglum, 150 S.W.2d 1088, 1090, 1093 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1941); Manus v. Kansas City Distrib. Corp., 74 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. 1934);
Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 153 A.2d 321, 324 (N.J. 1959);
Barnard v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 108 A.2d 873, 876 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1954); Blount v. Tow Fong, 138 A. 52, 53 (R.I. 1927); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 71, at 509.
69. 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.11, at 61 (2d ed.
1986). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958) ("In deter-
mining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the following... are considered: (a) the extent of control which... the master may
exercise over the details of the work . . ").
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. a (1965). In order to have a
master-servant relationship, the employer must retain the right to direct the de-
tails of how the work shall be done as well as the result to be accomplished. Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2). One is considered an em-
ployee, rather than an independent contractor, if the master retains supreme con-
trol and right of direction over the details of the work and not merely the ultimate
result. Irwin v. Klein, 271 N.Y. 477, 484, 3 N.E.2d 601, 605 (1936).
72. Sharkey v. Airco, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 646, 652 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (describing
the difference between an employer and an independent contractor; defining the
employer as one who only has the right to specify results and to insure that the
contract terms are fulfilled), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982); Drummond v.
Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 29, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (explaining that an in-
dependent contractor has exclusive control over the manner of performance and is
responsible only for the result); Manus v. Kansas City Distrib. Corp., 74 S.W.2d
506, 509 (Mo. 1934) (stating that an independent contractor renders service as to a
result and not the means by which it is accomplished); Soderback v. Townsend,
644 P.2d 640, 641 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (defining independent contractor as one who
carries on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his
own methods, without being subject to employer's control except as to the result,
not the means) (citing Oregon Fisheries Co. v. Elmore Packing Co., 138 P. 862,
863-64 (Or. 1914)); Damron v. C.R. Anthony Co., 586 S.W.2d 907, 912-13 (Tex. Ct.
9
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:871
fined an independent contractor as "one who, exercising an in-
dependent employment, contracts to do a piece of work
according to his own methods, and without being subject to the
control of his employer except, as to the result of his work."73
Thus, the exception is based on a lack of control over the acts of
the independent contractor. Because the employer lacks control
over the independent contractor, vicarious liability is not ex-
tended to the employer.74
Some commentators have argued that there should be vica-
rious liability for independent contractors because the employer
is still the person who benefits from the work.75 In fact, there
are exceptions to the independent contractor exception when
the employer is held vicariously liable for the acts of an in-
dependent contractor. 76 A well-known commentator, W. Page
Keeton, noted that the number of exceptions may be sufficient
to cast doubt upon the validity of the rule.77 It has been said,
and often quoted, that "the rule is now primarily [of impor-
tance] as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions."78 These
Civ. App. 1979) (explaining that absent a right of control the employee is an in-
dependent contractor).
73. Ostrander v. Billie Holm's Village Travel, 87 Misc. 2d 1049, 1051, 386
N.Y.S.2d 597, 599 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1976) (quoting Hogan v. Comac Sales
Inc., 245 A.D. 216, 221, 281 N.Y.S. 207, 213 (3d Dep't 1935) (Heffernan, J., dissent-
ing), aff'd, 271 N.Y. 562, 2 N.E.2d 695 (1936)). A Maryland court used a similar
definition in Kersten v. Van Grack, Axelson & Williamowsky, P.C., 608 A.2d 1270,
1272 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (giving a definition of independent contractor as a
person who contracts to perform work according to his own methods, free from
control of his employer except as to the result). See also Roscoe T. Steffen, In-
dependent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 502 (1934-35) ("A
person who undertakes to complete a specified job according to his own methods
and without being subject to the control of his employer as to the means of doing
the work is an independent contractor.").
74. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 71, at 509.
75. Id. The argument is that because the employer selects the contractor, he
can insist on a competent and financially responsible individual. Id. Courts have
departed from the rule of nonliability for the actions of independent contractors
because the employer is the party primarily to benefit by the enterprise. Foss v.
Anthony Indus., 189 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Van Arsdale v. Hollin-
ger, 437 P.2d 508, 513 (Cal. 1968)). This theory is similar to the benefit theory
used to define scope of employment. See supra part IIA.l.b.
76. See infra parts II.B.1-3.
77. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 71, at 510.
78. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn.
1937). See Misiulis v. Milbrand Maintenance Corp., 218 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1974) ("general rule serves merely as a prelude to a discussion of why it does
not apply"). One commentator predicted that ultimately the exception will become
880
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exceptions fall into three main categories: (1) negligence of the
employer in selecting, instructing, or supervising the independ-
ent contractor; 79 (2) nondelegable duty;80 and (3) work which is
inherently dangerous."' Therefore, employers may be liable for
acts of an independent contractor provided one of the above ex-
ceptions exists.
1. Negligence of Employer in Hiring or Supervising
The independent contractor exception is generally not ap-
plied where an employer is negligent in hiring or supervising an
independent contractor.8 2 An employer has a "duty to exercise
reasonable care to select a competent, experienced, and careful
contractor ... ."83 Failure to employ a competent and careful
contractor to do work involving a risk of physical harm there-
fore results in liability for the employer.84 In addition, the em-
ployer must stop unnecessarily dangerous practices of which he
the "general rule." KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 71, at 509 (citing Clarence
Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 339 (1934)).
79. See infra part II.B.1.
80. See infra part ll.B.2.
81. Wright v. Tudor City Twelfth Unit, 276 N.Y. 303, 307, 12 N.E.2d 307, 308
(1938); Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 448, 3 N.E.2d 588, 589 (1936); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965). See infra part fl.B.3.
82. Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 513-14 (N.J. 1982); Wilk v. Haus, 460
A.2d 288, 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject
to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders of [sic] in failing to make proper
regulations; or (b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentali-
ties in work involving risk of harm to others; (c) in the supervision of the
activity; or (d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious
conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or
with instrumentalities under his control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958). See generally 5 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 69, § 26.4, at 16-17.
83. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 71, at 510. An employer has a duty to hire
a "competent and careful contractor" to do work that involves a risk of physical
harm if not done carefully. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965). See
also Steffen, supra note 73, at 505 (the employer has a duty to select a competent
contractor).
84. Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268, 271
(M.D. Pa.) (holding an employer liable for furnishing an incompetent, inexperi-
enced blaster), aff'd, 387 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1967).
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is aware,8 5 and inspect completed work to be sure it is safe. 6 If
an employer breaches any of these duties, he is liable for the
negligence of the independent contractor.87 This is not truly an
imputation of liability because the employer was at fault for
negligent supervision.88 Thus, although the employer does not
actually cause the harm, he is considered at fault.
The employer may be liable for failure to make an adequate
inquiry into the employee's qualifications. 89 Liability is im-
posed if the employer knew or should have known the employee
was not qualified for the jobf 0 However, the employer may be
85. If the general contractor knows that the subcontractor is doing negligent
work, he may be liable for any injury resulting from the subcontractor's negligence.
Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 152, 48 N.E.2d 299, 302
(1943) (citing Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 260 N.Y. 162, 166, 183 N.E. 282, 283 (1932)).
See also Funk v. General Motors Corp., 220 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Mich. 1974) (holding
that the employer has a duty to provide proper supervision and inspection and to
stop work which is an obvious dereliction of duty), overruled in part by Hardy v.
Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1982).
86. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 71, at 510. See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF ToRTs § 412 cmt. a (1965) ("[This section requires the employer of a con-
tractor to exercise reasonable care to subject the work after completion to such an
inspection as is reasonable under the circumstances."). See generally McGuire v.
Hartford Buick Co., 40 A.2d 269, 270-71 (Conn. 1944) (holding employer has a duty
to inspect completed work before accepting); Schwartz v. Zulka, 175 A.2d 465, 467
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (holding employer has a duty to inspect before
accepting completed work), modified sub nom. Schwartz v. North Jersey Bldg. Con-
tractors Corp., 182 A.2d 865 (N.J. 1962).
87. Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Minn. 1983).
88. Sharkey v. Airco, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 646, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (explaining
that negligent supervision is based on direct negligence of the landowner-employer
and not imputation of negligence on the part of the independent contractor), aff'd,
688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982); Allen v. Toledo, 167 Cal. Rptr. 270, 273-74 (Ct. App.
1980) (stating that liability for negligent entrustment is not truly vicarious liabil-
ity because it is based on the defendant's own acts); 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note
69, § 26.1, at 4 ("The principle that rests liability on individualized fault covers
these situations without any fiction, extension, or distortion.").
89. Western Stock Ctr., Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 578 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1978)
(holding employer has a duty of reasonable care in selecting a properly qualified
contractor); Ponticas v. KIM.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. 1983); Galentine
v. Borglum, 150 S.W.2d 1088, 1092 (Mo. 1941); Hudgens v. Cook Indus., Inc., 521
P.2d 813, 815 (Okla. 1973) (holding employer liable because he made no inquiry
concerning the employee's ability or equipment).
90. Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 510 F.2d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 1975);
Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 1241, 1248 (Ill. App. 1979)
(allowing a cause of action against an employer for hiring a person the employer
should have known was unfit for the position); Galentine v. Borglum, 150 S.W.2d
1088, 1093-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (holding employer liable for selecting a mani-
festly unfit person such as a driver with poor vision); Frontier Theatre Inc. v.
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relieved of liability if he has exercised due care in selecting a
competent contractor. 9' A competent contractor is "one who
possesses the knowledge, skill, experience, personal character-
istics, and available equipment which a reasonable man would
realize that an independent [sic] contractor must have in order
to do the work which he contracts to do without creating unrea-
sonable risk of injury to others."92
2. Nondelegable Duties
"The real question in all independent contractor cases is
whether one may 'farm out' or 'lop off' some of one's affairs and
escape liabilities in connection with them."93 The privilege to
"farm out" has its iimits.94 One such limit is when the employer
has a nondelegable duty.95 This duty may be imposed by stat-
ute,96 contract,97 or common law.98 For example, a landlord has
Whisenant, 291 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1956) (holding owner liable for entrusting
vehicle to unlicensed driver).
91. Hudgens v. Cook Indus., Inc., 521 P.2d 813, 816 (Okla. 1973).
92. Hudgens, 521 P.2d at 816 (citing Risley v. Lenwell, 277 P.2d 897,908 (Cal.
1955)).
93. 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 69, § 26.11, at 73.
94. Id.
95. A nondelegable duty is one which the employer is not free to delegate.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, at 394 (1965).
"[Tihe person upon whom it is imposed [is required] to answer for it that care is
exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent contractor, to whom the
performance of the duty is entrusted." Id.
96. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 241(6) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995) (imposing
a nondelegable duty on construction contractors to provide a safe working environ-
ment); Celestine v. City of New York, 86 A.D.2d 592, 593, 446 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132
(2d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 938, 453 N.E.2d 548, 466 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1983).
See also Holman v. State, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (Ct. App. 1975) (finding that a
statutory duty exists to provide a guard on revolving or reciprocating parts of a
machine); Strayer v. Lindeman, 427 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ohio 1981) (explaining that
a landlord has a statutory duty to keep up with repairs and keep premises fit and
habitable); Choctaw, 0. & W. Ry. v. Wilker, 84 P. 1086, 1090 (Okla. 1906) (stating
that a railroad has a statutory duty to keep the highway safe where it intersects
the railroad).
97. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn.
1937) ("Where one person owes another a contractual duty to act, the law imposes
upon the person owing that duty the further duty of acting with due care in the
performance of his contract so as not to injure the contractee's person or property.
This duty is nondelegable."); Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N.Y. 77, 82-83, 91 N.E. 263, 264-
65 (1910) (creating duty to provide elevator service by lease).
98. Rozmajzl v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 49 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1951)
(holding carrier of passengers has duty to exercise more than ordinary care to pro-
13
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a common law "duty to maintain [a] staircase in a reasonably
safe condition for use. That duty [is] of a personal character.
[He can] not discharge it by delegating the operations even to a
competent independent contractor."99 The performance of the
contract may be delegated, but that does not relieve the em-
ployer of his contractual duty.100 Another nondelegable duty,
imposed by common law, is that of an owner of a building "to
protect members of the public traveling on the sidewalk."10 1
Generally, courts have not stated principles to define a non-
delegable duty.102 No criterion exists to determine the charac-
ter of a nondelegable duty other than a court's conclusion that
"the responsibility is so important to the community that the
employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another."103
The New York Court of Appeals recently noted that nondelega-
ble duties fall into four general situations. 104 In those situations
where a nondelegable duty exists, "the employer is as liable for
the conduct of the contractor as though it were his own."105
tect passengers); Banaghan v. Dewey, 162 N.E.2d 807, 811 (Mass. 1959) (holding
landlord must use reasonable care to keep common passageways in good condi-
tion); Page v. Sloan, 190 S.E.2d 189, 192 (N.C. 1972) (stating innkeeper has non-
delegable duty to keep premises in reasonably safe condition); Eide v. Skerbeck, 8
N.W.2d 282, 285 (Wis. 1943) (explaining that persons conducting places of amuse-
ment must use ordinary care to keep them safe for the public). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, at 394 (1965).
99. Russo v. Watson, 249 A.D. 782, 782, 292 N.Y.S. 249, 250 (2d Dep't 1936)
(citing Paltey v. Egan, 200 N.Y. 83, 91, 93 N.E. 267, 269 (1910)).
100. Pacific Fire Ins., 277 N.W.2d at 228; see also Miles v. R & M Appliance
Sales Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 451, 453, 259 N.E.2d 913, 916, 311 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493-94
(1970) (delegating performance of the assumed responsibility to an independent
contractor did not absolve the employer of liability).
101. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 155, 48 N.E.2d
299, 304 (1943) (citing Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 3 N.E. 588 (1936); Appel v.
Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 280, 186 N.E. 785, 785 (1933)).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, at
394 (1965).
103. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 71, at 512. "There are also situations
wherein the law views a person's duty as so important and so peremptory that it
will be treated as nondelegable." 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 69, § 26.11, at 83.
104. Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assurances Soc'y of the United States, 79
N.Y.2d 663, 668, 595 N.E.2d 840, 842-43, 584 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767-68 (1992). There
may be a statutory duty, a duty assumed by contract, a duty to keep the premises
safe, or the work may involve special inherent danger. Id.
105. 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 69, § 26.11, at 88.
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One duty courts have found nondelegable is the upkeep of a
car by its owner.106 In Maloney v. Rath, 0 7 the defendant's auto-
mobile hit a car the plaintiff was driving because of a brake fail-
ure. 08 The court held the defendant liable in spite of the fact
that the defendant had just had her brakes repaired and it was
the mechanic's negligence, rather than her own, that caused the
brake failure resulting in an accident. 1°9 Responsibility for
maintaining an automobile has fallen on the owner because it is
deemed important to the public."o
The Maloney court explained the policy underlying the im-
position of liability based on the negligence of an independent
contractor:
Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates not as a sub-
stitute for liability based on negligence, but to assure that when a
negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compen-
sated by the person whose activity caused the harm and who may
therefore properly be held liable for the negligence of his agent,
whether his agent was an employee or an independent
contractor."'1
Imposing liability also encourages the hiring of responsible
subcontractors." 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section
429 states that:
one who employs an independent contractor to perform services
for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the
services are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of
the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as
though the employer were supplying them himself or by his
servants. 113
New York adopted this doctrine in Miles v. R & M Appli-
ance Sales, Inc. "1 Miles was a personal injury case involving an
106. Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 514.
109. Id. at 516-17.
110. Id. at 516.
111. Id. at 515.
112. Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290, 301, 376 N.E.2d 1276,
1280, 405 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1978).
113. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op ToiRrs § 429 (1965).
114. 26 N.Y.2d 451, 454, 259 N.E.2d 913, 915, 311 N.Y.S.2d 491, 494 (1970).
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air conditioner repair. 115 The plaintiff had bought a defective
air conditioner from the defendant. 116 When the plaintiff dis-
covered that the air conditioner was defective, she went to the
defendant who assured her that "the matter would receive their
prompt attention."11 7 The shop manager repeatedly promised
the plaintiff that the unit would be repaired by the shop."" Be-
cause the defendant-seller did not have a service department, it
had to hire an independent contractor to make the repair. After
repairing it, the repairman left the air conditioner outside of the
plaintiff's apartment where she tripped over it."1 Because
plaintiff reasonably believed the defendant would make the re-
pairs and he undertook this responsibility of repair, redelivery
and reinstallation, he was liable for the negligence of the
repairman. 120
In Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital,'2' vicarious liability was
applied to an emergency room facility at a hospital. Mduba was
a wrongful death action in which blood was not available in
time for a transfusion. 122 The plaintiff contended that the hos-
pital was negligent because the doctor failed to take a blood
sample from the decedent and failed to order blood.123 Although
the hospital had a contract with the doctor that stated the
emergency room doctors were not employees, 24 the hospital
maintained a sufficient amount of control so that the doctor was
not an independent contractor but an employee of the hospi-
tal.'25 In addition, the court pointed out that
[p]atients entering the hospital through the emergency room
could properly assume that the treating doctors and staff of the
hospital were acting on behalf of the hospital. Such patients are
115. Id. at 452, 259 N.E.2d at 914, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 454, 259 N.E.2d at 915, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
119. Id. at 453, 259 N.E.2d at 915, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
120. Id. at 454, 259 N.E.2d at 916, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
121. 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (3d Dep't 1976).
122. Id. at 451, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
123. Id, at 451-52, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
124. Id. at 452, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
125. Id. at 453, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
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not bound by secret limitations as are contained in a private con-
tract between the hospital and the doctor. 126
The New York Court of Appeals has held that one who employs
an independent contractor to perform services that the individ-
ual has undertaken to perform is liable for the negligence of the
independent contractor. 127 The hospital held itself out to the
public as providing emergency medical care services, thereby
creating a duty to perform those services. 128 The hospital was,
therefore, liable for negligent performance of those services by
the staff it hired to provide the services.129
3. Inherently Dangerous Activities
If one engages in inherently dangerous activities, 130 he is
subject to vicarious liability for the torts of an independent con-
tractor.' 3 ' An activity is inherently dangerous if the work, by
126. Id. See also Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 989, 994-95,
523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348, 351-52 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1987) (holding that pa-
tients are not bound by limitations imposed by private contracts between a doctor
and a hospital).
127. Miles v. R & M Appliance Sales, Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 451, 453, 259 N.E.2d
913, 915, 311 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (1970).
128. Mduba, 52 A.D.2d at 453-54, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529-30. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) ("One who represents that another is his
servant or other agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon
the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for
harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or
other agent as if he were such.").
129. Mduba, 52 A.D.2d at 454, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
130. This is not the same inherent danger that leads to strict liability. 5
HARPER ET AL., supra note 69, § 26.11, at 89.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 427 (1965).
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special
danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be
inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason
to contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable
precautions against such danger.
Id.
[W]hile under the law the owner of a building who hires an independent
contractor to do work is not ordinarily liable for the negligence of the con-
tractor's servants, there is an exception to that rule in a case where the
nature of the work contracted to be done involves the creation of a danger-
ous condition ....
May v. 11 1/2 East 49th Street Co., 269 A.D. 180, 181, 54 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (1st
Dep't 1945), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 599, 68 N.E.2d 881 (1946).
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its nature, is likely to cause injury to others.132 Work that in-
volves a peculiar risk of harm, if precautions are not taken, is
also considered inherently dangerous. 133 Another explanation
of what constitutes an inherently dangerous activity is found in
Western Stock Center Inc. v. Sevit, Inc.'3 4 In Sevit, a fire oc-
curred during the removal of pipes by an independent contrac-
tor.135 The Colorado Supreme Court discussed the law of
liability for the acts of an independent contractor. 136 The court
held that there may have been negligence in the selection of the
independent contractor because, on inquiry, the defendant
could have discovered that the independent contractor was in-
experienced in doing this work.137 The court went on to discuss
situations when vicarious liability applies. It stated that vicari-
ous liability applies in the case of an independent contractor if
the activity is inherently dangerous. 3 An inherently danger-
ous activity is work which presents a "foreseeable and signifi-
cant risk of harm to others if not carefully carried out." 3 9
Courts have held various activities create a peculiar risk of
harm. 40 For example, New York imposes a strict duty of care
132. Blount v. Tow Fong, 138 A. 52, 53-54 (R.I. 1927) (erecting and maintain-
ing a sign that overhangs a busy sidewalk creates an absolute nondelegable duty
to take precautions to avoid injury to third persons). An inherent danger exists if
danger adheres in the instrumentality such that special precautions are required
to avoid injury. Feyers v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(holding that a nondelegable duty exists to insure the inherently dangerous activ-
ity is conducted with the requisite degree of care), vacated, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
133. Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 153 A.2d 321, 323,
326 (N.J. 1959) (characterizing demolition of a building adjacent to buildings to be
left untouched as hazardous work). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 416 (1965).
134. 578 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1978).
135. Id. at 1047.
136. Id. at 1048-50.
137. Id. at 1049.
138. Id. at 1049-50.
139. Id. at 1050.
140. See, e.g., Emelwon Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir.)
(cropdusting is inherently dangerous), cert. denied sub nom. Florida v. Emelwon,
Inc., 393 U.S. 841 (1968); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. L'Enfant Plaza
Properties, Inc., 448 A.2d 864,866-67,868-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (backfilling an exca-
vation is hazardous work); Curtis v. Kiley, 26 N.E. 421, 421 (Mass. 1891) (digging
trench across a passageway is inherently dangerous); Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc.
v. Toti Contracting Co., 153 A.2d 321, 323 (N.J. 1959) (demolition of a building
adjacent to a building to be left untouched is inherently dangerous).
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on those who work on a public highway "to guard against risk
inherent in the work."141 Another activity that the court found
to be inherently dangerous is repairing an elevator. 142
As with every rule, the inherently dangerous activity excep-
tion has its limits. "Even where the employer's duty is nondele-
gable ... the employer will not be liable for negligence of the
independent contractor that is 'collateral' to the nondelegable
duty."143 Where the danger arises because of negligence which
was not reasonably to be expected, the employer is not liable.'"
This principle was applied in Hyman v. Barrett.145 Hyman in-
volved a tenant who was struck by a board that fell from a scaf-
fold while repairs were in progress at his building.146 The
tenant sued the landlord. The New York Court of Appeals de-
clined to hold the landlord liable for the injury because the land-
lord could not have anticipated this danger. 147 The court held
that the defendant had fulfilled his duty to provide a safe court-
yard. 148 Accordingly, the landlord was not liable for any danger
that was not inherent in the work contracted for.149
The court applied this principle again in May v. 11 1/2 East
49th Street Co. 150 The case involved an independent contractor
hired to paint a tenant's apartment. 151 The plaintiff slipped on
a streak of shellac that was on the floor, fell and injured her-
self.152 Since painting is not ordinarily an inherently dangerous
141. Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 450, 3 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1936) (Lehman, J.,
dissenting in part).
142. Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N.Y. 357, 362, 130 N.E. 577, 578 (1921).
See also State of New York v. Schenectady Chems., 103 A.D.2d 33, 38, 479
N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (3d Dep't 1984) (disposal of hazardous waste may be consid-
ered inherently dangerous).
143. 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 69, § 26.11, at 93.
144. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 152, 48 N.E.2d
299, 302 (1943). See also Balagna v. Shawnee County, 668 P.2d 157, 167 (Kan.
1983) (explaining that danger must inhere in performance of contract and result
directly from the work to be done, otherwise there is no liability).
145. 224 N.Y. 436, 121 N.E. 271 (1918).
146. Id. at 437, 121 N.E. at 271.
147. Id. at 438, 121 N.E. at 272.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 439, 121 N.E. at 272. The employer is not liable for negligence that
is collateral. Balagna v. Shawnee County, 668 P.2d 157, 167 (Kan. 1983).
150. 269 A.D. 180, 54 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1945).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 181, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
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activity, 53 the danger was not foreseeable. 54 Therefore, the
employer was not liable for the negligence of the independent
contractor painter.155 The negligence "arose casually out of the
performance or in the progress of the work, and thus was 'collat-
eral' negligence for which the employer of an independent con-
tractor would not be liable."156
Thus, the doctrine of vicarious liability does not provide a
bright line test for when an employer will be liable for the acts
of his employee. Only after considering whether the employee
is an agent or an independent contractor can one begin to apply
the rules of vicarious liability. Moreover, even once it is deter-
mined that the person causing the injury was an independent
contractor, one must decide if one of the exceptions applies.
Therefore, an employer has to be extremely careful about who
he hires, how much supervision and inspection he provides and
what responsibilities he assumes.
C. Process Server Negligence
1. In New York
Despite the general expansion of liability in many in-
stances, at least one area remained unaffected by the rules of
vicarious liability until recently. It was not until 1993 that the
New York Court of Appeals imposed vicarious liability on a law-
yer for the negligence of a process server.157
In 1984, the New York County Supreme Court refused to
extend vicarious liability to a lawyer for the malfeasance of a
process server in Bockian v. Esanu, Katsky, Korins & Siger.158
The court reasoned that "[a]n attorney does not generally retain
153. Id. at 183, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
154. Id. at 184, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
155. Id. at 187, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
156. Id. at 187, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
157. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 614 N.E.2d 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149
(1993).
158. 124 Misc. 2d 607, 476 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984). The
following acts were alleged:
Specifically, it is alleged that the process server continuously rang the
doorbell at 36 East 63rd Street. He then allegedly solicited a delivery per-
son who had access to the premises in an attempt to gain access for himself
Further, it is alleged that a scurrilous sign saying that plaintiff suffered
from "venereal herpes" was taped by the process server to the building, and
threats were made to tape similar signs all over the city. It is also alleged
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a sufficient degree of control over an independent process
server's performance of his duties ... ."159 It characterized the
process server as an independent contractor.160 The court based
this determination on the fact that the attorney "did not select
the particular process server, nor did [he] direct the manner for
effecting service of process."161 The court explained that none of
the established exceptions applied and that if it created a new
exception, it would have a "chilling effect" on citizens' attempts
to settle disputes through the legal process. 162
In Balzano v. Lublin, 63 the New York Appellate Division,
First Department, acknowledged the fact that a process server
was an independent contractor. 64 Balzano was a landlord-ten-
ant dispute. 65 The court superficially addressed the issue of
whether a process server was an independent contractor, in
dicta, in a single sentence at the end of the opinion.16 6 The issue
was not contested and the court did not challenge the
assertion.167
The First Department addressed the issue of an attorney's
liability for negligent service again in Robinson v. Jacoby &
Meyers.168 In Robinson, the plaintiff alleged that the process
server forwarded an affidavit of service to the defendant law
firm without serving process. 69 The court recognized that the
allegations were "wholly conclusory, and . . . therefore legally
that the process server assaulted Mrs. Bockian when she attempted to pho-
tograph him.
Id. at 608, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
159. Id. at 610, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
160. Id. at 610-11, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 1013. The Third Department also charac-
terized a process server as an independent contractor when faced with the issues of
whether an agency must pay unemployment insurance for process servers. In re
Paragon Process Serv. Inc., 103 A.D.2d 882, 882, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1009-10 (3d
Dep't 1984).
161. Bockian, 124 Misc. 2d at 611, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
162. Id. Justice Saxe characterized the notion of an attorney's being liable for
the alleged bad acts of a process server as "ludicrous". Id. at 611, 476 N.Y.S.2d at
1013.
163. 162 A.D.2d 252, 556 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1st Dep't 1990).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 252, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
166. Id. at 253, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
167. Id.
168. 167 A.D.2d 134, 561 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1990).
169. Id. at 134, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
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insufficient to charge an attorney with negligence and malprac-
tice." 170 No discussion of vicarious liability appears in the opin-
ion, and the issue was not mentioned again until Kleeman v.
Rheingold,171 the focus of this Note.
2. Other States' Handling of Process Servers
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals confronted the is-
sue of process server negligence in Kersten v. Van Grack, Axel-
son & Williamowsky.172 There the court held that a law firm did
not exercise a sufficient degree of control over process servers to
impose vicarious liability on the law firm.173 Kersten was a
summary judgment proceeding.' 74 The appellee law firm was
hired by the defendant in the first action to represent her.175
The law firm filed a third party complaint against appellants,
and hired a process server to serve them.176 The process server
submitted affidavits stating that he had personally served the
appellants. 177 However, there had been no personal service and
a default judgment was eventually entered against appel-
lants.178 Despite the default judgment's being vacated, appel-
lants brought an action against the process server and the law
firm. 79 The court found a process server to be an independent
contractor due to a lack of control or agency relationship. 0 The
law firm could not dictate how or when service would be made
but merely who had to be served.' 8 ' The process server set his
own hours, had his own office and had no obligation to accept
work from the law firm. 8 2 Based on these facts, the court held
the process server was an independent contractor.183 The plain-
tiff asserted that a nondelegable duty was necessary as a policy
170. Id.
171. 81 N.Y.2d 270, 614 N.E.2d 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1993).
172. 608 A.2d 1270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
173. Id. at 1271.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1271-72.
180. Id. at 1272.
181. Id. at 1274.
182. Id. at 1273.
183. Id. at 1274.
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matter to protect the public from negligent process servers. 8 4
She relied on the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct as an
expression of this public policy.'8 5 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the defendant law firm had a nondelegable duty
based on the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 86 because
the rules of professional conduct do not provide a basis upon
which to impose civil liability. 8 7 It went on to note that the
rules are intended "to provide guidance to lawyers and to pro-
vide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies." 88 The Maryland court was "not persuaded that im-
position of a non-delegable duty on appellee [was]
warranted."'8 9
A California court, in an unpublished opinion, handled the
issue of whether an attorney is liable for the negligence of a pro-
cess server differently from the Maryland court in Kersten.190
Without addressing the specific issue of whether a process
server is an independent contractor, the court held the attorney
bore the ultimate responsibility for serving process in order to
comply with the court order.191 The court noted that "[t]he pro-
cess server's negligence did not relieve counsel of his duty to
[follow a court order]."1 92
Other states have not faced the issue of who bears the ulti-
mate responsibility for insuring proper service. The New York
County Supreme Court stated that its research had not re-
vealed any reported opinions in New York or other jurisdictions
that imputed liability to a law firm for the negligence of a pro-
184. Id. at 1275.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1275-76.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1275.
189. Id. at 1276. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that vicarious
liability should be imposed based on the work contracted to be done, without dis-
cussion. Id.
190. Tkaczyk v. City of Los Angeles, 251 Cal. Rptr. 75 (Ct. App. 1988).
191. Id. at 79. But see Zincoris v. Hobart Bros. Co., 611 N.E.2d 1327, 1333 (IIl.
App. Ct. 1993) (holding the party has the nondelegable duty to take all steps neces-
sary to bring his case to a prompt conclusion, including insuring service of process
is accomplished); Schusterman v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Found., 552
N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (IMI. App. Ct. 1990) (holding plaintiff has the duty of obtaining
proper service).
192. Tkaczyk, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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cess server. 193 However, at least one court has held a process
server to be an employee for purposes of unemployment
insurance.194
III. Kleeman v. Rheingold
A. Facts
What should have been an ordinary medical malpractice
suit resulted in a revolutionary legal malpractice case because
of a mistake by a process server. 195 On November 2, 1978,
plaintiff, Janet Kleeman, retained the defendant law firm to
commence a medical malpractice suit against New York Hospi-
tal and Doctor Neils Laursen, who had treated Mrs. Kleeman
between November 14, 1972 and May 7, 1976.196 Two days
before the statute of limitations was to run, the defendant law
firm delivered a summons and complaint to the law firm's regu-
lar process serving agency, Fischer's Service Bureau Inc., with
notice that the statute of limitations would expire on November
7, 1978, and the request that service should be made
immediately. 197
Jerome Campbell, an employee of Fischer's Service Bureau,
submitted an affidavit of service stating that Dr. Laursen had
been personally served on November 8, 1978.198 In his answer
dated February 8, 1979, Dr. Laursen raised the affirmative de-
fense of lack of personal jurisdiction because he had not been
193. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 148 Misc. 2d 853, 853, 562 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
194. Legal Process Serv., Inc. v. Ward, 518 N.E.2d 768, 770-72 (111. App. Ct.
1988). But see Fullerton v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 661 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding process servers to be independent contractors). However,
neither court discussed who bore responsibility for insuring proper service of
process.
195. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 614 N.E.2d 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149
(1993). The mistake was that the process server served the papers on the physi-
cian's secretary rather than the physician himself. Id. at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 714,
598 N.Y.S.2d at 151. Nevertheless, the process server stated in an affidavit that
he had made personal service upon the physician. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 185
A.D.2d 118, 118, 585 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (1st Dep't 1992). After a traverse hearing,
the court held that there was no jurisdiction over the physician "because he had
never been personally served." Id.
196. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 148 Misc. 2d 853, 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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personally served within the time frame required by CPLR sec-
tion 203(b)(5).199 Justice Beverly Cohen determined that ser-
vice was not untimely because November 7, 1978 was a legal
holiday; ° however, "[s~he referred the factual issue of whether
the process server actually served Doctor Laursen to a referee
for a traverse hearing."2°1 The claim was dismissed when the
referee found that the "process server had given the papers to
Dr. Laursen's secretary rather than Dr. Laursen himself."20 2
A jury trial was held on the claim against the hospital and
resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendant.23  On February
8, 1989, plaintiff commenced this action for legal malpractice
against the defendant law firm.204 She alleged "failure to timely
commence an action against Doctor Laursen and failure to
properly supervise the process server with respect to the timeli-
ness of service of the complaint."20 5
B. Supreme Court Disposition
The New York County Supreme Court was responsible for
ruling on the complaint, along with the defendant's motion for
199. Id. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 203(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1995) provides an
opportunity to extend the statute of limitations by filing the summons and com-
plaint with the county clerk. The plaintiff then has sixty days to serve the defend-
ant. Id.
Since Kleeman was decided, the filing rules in New York have been amended.
See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 65, 65 (1993) ("Effective
December 31, 1992, all civil actions in supreme and county courts must be com-
menced by filing a summons and complaint.... ."). Under the current rule, an
action is commenced and the statute of limitations stops running upon the filing of
a summons and complaint with the county clerk N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 304
(McKinney Supp. 1995). The plaintiff then has 120 days to file proof of service.
N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 306-b(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
200. 148 Misc. 2d at 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916. November 7, 1978 was election
day, a public holiday according to N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAw § 24 (McKinney 1951 &
Supp. 1995) ("The term public holiday includes.., each general election day...").
201. 148 Misc. 2d at 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916. A traverse hearing is held to
determine whether there is jurisdiction.
202. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 614 N.E.2d 712, 714, 598
N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (1993). See supra note 2.
203. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 714, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
204. Kleeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916. The legal malprac-
tice claim was commenced eleven years after the medical malpractice claim. There
was no statute of limitations problem, however, because the legal malpractice
claim did not accrue until the final dismissal of the original claim in 1987. Kiee-
man, 81 N.Y.2d at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 714, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
205. Kleeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 854-55, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
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summary judgment and the plaintiff's cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment.206 Plaintiff argued, in her motion papers, that
the process server was an agent of the attorney and that the
attorney had a nondelegable duty to commence the action.20 7
She claimed that the defendant should have supervised the ser-
vice of the summons and complaint more carefully. 20 She also
made reference to Fischer's reputation as "being notorious for
sloppy and casual service."209 Defendant contended that he de-
livered the summons and complaint to Fischer prior to the expi-
ration of the statute of limitations and advised it that "service
had to be made immediately."210 Selection of the individual pro-
cess server and the precise manner of service was left to the
Fischer Service Bureau.211
The Supreme Court held that a process server is an in-
dependent contractor and not an agent of the attorney who
hires him.21 2 Recognizing that the attorney did not have control
over the details of the service, the court explained that the pro-
cess server had discretion in providing the method of service in-
cluding the time, place, and manner. 21 3 Because of this lack of
control, the court declined to "extend an attorney's responsibil-
ity to impose a duty to oversee the actions of a process
server."21 4 The court granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, dismissed the complaint, and denied the plain-
tiff's cross-motion for summary judgment.215
C. Appellate Division's Treatment
A divided panel of the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, affirmed the lower court's decision for much the same rea-
206. Id. at 853, 855 n.2, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916, 917 n.2.
207. Id. at 855, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
208. Id. at 855, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
209. Id. See also supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
210. Kleeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 855, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
211. Id. Because the process server is an independent contractor, the method
of service is within the process server's discretion. Id. See supra notes 172-73 and
accompanying text.
212. Keeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 855, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Robinson v. Jacoby & Meyers, 167 A.D.2d 134, 561 N.Y.S.2d
221 (1st Dep't 1990)).
215. Id. at 855 n.2, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 917 n.2.
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son.216 Citing Balzano v. Lublin,217 the majority held, "under
New York law, an attorney cannot be held vicariously liable for
the negligence of a process server when the process server is an
independent contractor and further the attorney receives an af-
fidavit of service in proper form."218 Justices Milonas and Ro-
senberger dissented. 219
1. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Milonas
Justice Milonas believed "there [were] factual matters in-
volved herein which preclude[d] summary judgment."220 There
was no indication that the defendant law firm supervised the
accomplishment of process beyond "merely delegating the ser-
vice of process to Fischer Service Bureau ... despite its knowl-
edge that there were only two days remaining for undertaking
valid service."221 The defendant law firm did not take the oppor-
tunity to protect against defective service by filing the summons
and complaint with the county clerk. 222 Justice Milonas noted
that the plaintiff had also presented evidence that the process
server used by defendant had a "history of performing its task
in a slipshod manner."223
216. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 185 A.D.2d 118, 585 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1st Dep't
1992).
217. 162 A.D.2d 252, 556 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1st Dep't 1990). Balzano was a land-
lord-tenant case in which the First Department summarily stated that a process
server is an independent contractor and, accordingly, the defendant is not liable
for the negligence of the process server. Id. at 253, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 611. See supra
text accompanying notes 163-67.
218. Kleeman, 185 A.D.2d at 119, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
219. Id. at 119, 122, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 735, 736.
220. Id. at 120, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 203(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1993) provides an
automatic sixty-day extension of the statute of limitations if the complaint is deliv-
ered to the county sheriff or filed with the county clerk within the statute of limita-
tions. See supra note 199.
This point has even more force under the new filing law. See supra note 199.
Filing the summons and complaint with the clerk commences the action and stops
the statute of limitations. It provides 120 days after filing the summons and com-
plaint with the clerk to file proof of service on the defendant. "If the action was
timely commenced but dismissed 'for failure to effect proper service,' i.e.,... failure
to make proper service pursuant to the strict compliance requirements in New
York, plaintiff may reffle and receive another 120 days to complete the service,"
even if the statute of limitations would otherwise have already run. Carlisle,
supra note 199, at 75.
223. KMeeman, 185 A.D.2d at 120, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
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Justice Milonas criticized the majority224 for relying on
Balzano v. Lublin.2 5 The Balzano majority held that an attor-
ney could not be vicariously liable for the negligence of the pro-
cess server because "the attorney does not retain a sufficient
degree of control over the process server's performance of his
duties."22 Justice Milonas noted that Balzano's only reference
to a process server is a brief comment, without further discus-
sion, that he is an independent contractor. 227 The Balzano case,
in Justice Milonas's words, "dealt with an entirely different
matter. 228
The other case the Kleeman majority cited, Robinson v.
Jacoby & Meyers,229 held the allegations insufficient to charge
an attorney with malpractice. 30 Justice Milonas noted that
"[t]he Court of Appeals has held that a defendant who retains
an independent contractor to fulfill services that the former has
agreed to perform is liable for the negligence of that independ-
ent contractor."231 Justice Milonas noted that although the gen-
eral rule is that an employer is not liable for the acts of
independent contractors, there are growing public policy excep-
tions.232 Because the lawyer was the client's agent, Fischer's
Service Bureau, even if an independent contractor, was a sub-
agent. 2m According to Justice Milonas,
there is certainly a question of fact involved here as to whether
defendant was negligent in failing to monitor the manner in
224. Id. (Milonas, J., dissenting).
225. 162 A.D.2d 252, 556 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1st Dep't 1990).
226. Kieeman, 185 A.D.2d at 120, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (Milonas, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. See Balzano v. Lublin, 162 A.D.2d 252, 253, 556 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611
("[Tihe third-party defendant has asserted, without contradiction, that its process
server was an independent contractor.").
228. Kleeman, 185 A.D.2d at 120, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (Milonas, J.,
dissenting).
229. 167 A.D.2d 134, 561 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1990).
230. Kleeman, 185 A.D.2d at 120, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (citing Robinson, 167
A.D.2d at 134, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 221).
231. Id. at 121, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (citing Miles v. R & M Appliances Sales,
26 N.Y.2d 451, 259 N.E.2d 913, 311 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1970); Mduba v. Benedictine
Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (3d Dep't 1976)).
232. Id. These exceptions are for negligent supervision, see supra part II.B.1,
nondelegable duties, see supra part II.B.2, and inherently dangerous activities, see
supra part II.B.3.
233. An independent contractor may be an agent or a subagent. Kleeman, 185
A.D.2d at 121, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
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which the process server carried out its delegated duties or in not
taking any other means to protect against faulty service, such as
filing the summons and complaint with the county clerk.23 4
2. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Rosenberger
Justice Rosenberger's dissent is based on more narrow
grounds than Justice Milonas's dissent.235 He stated that de-
fendant's failure to take the precaution against defective service
provided by CPLR section 203(b)(5) 236 may be negligence in it-
self.237 Justice Rosenberger believed it was at least a question
of fact.2  However, he agreed with the majority that an attor-
ney should not be vicariously liable for a negligent process
server who is an independent contractor.23 9
D. Court of Appeals Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
The New York Court of Appeals modified the judgment of
the lower courts. 240 In an opinion by Judge Titone, the court
acknowledged that the "threshold issue . . . [was] whether an
attorney may be held vicariously liable to his or her client for
the negligence of a process server . . . hired on behalf of [the]
client."241 However, the Court of Appeals reached a different
conclusion than the two lower courts and denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 4 The court held that the de-
fendants had a nondelegable duty to Mrs. Kleeman and they
could not evade their legal responsibility for performance of
that duty by assigning the task of serving process to an "in-
dependent contractor."243
234. Id. at 121-22, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
235. Id. at 122, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
236. See supra note 222.
237. Kleeman, 185 A.D.2d at 122, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37 (Rosenberger, J.,
dissenting).
238. Id. at 122, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
239. Id. at 122, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37.
240. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 614 N.E.2d 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149
(1993). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Kleeman's cross-motion for
summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion. Id. at 278-79, 614 N.E.2d
at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
241. Id. at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 713-14, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 150-51.
242. Id. at 273, 614 N.E.2d at 714, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
243. Id.
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The court recognized the general rule of nonliability for in-
dependent contractors and observed that it "'is now primarily
important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.'"244
The exceptions have been established for public policy reasons
and fall into three basic categories: (1) negligence of employer in
selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor;245 (2) em-
ployment work that is inherently dangerous;246 and (3) "in-
stances in which the employer is under a specific nondelegable
duty."247
The court affirmed the adoption of the Restatement's defini-
tion of nondelegable duty.2  The court held that the duty at
issue "fits squarely and neatly within the category of obligations
that the law regards as 'nondelegable.'"249 Proper service of
process is an integral part of the task an attorney under-
takes. 250 A mistake in service may deprive a client of his or her
day in court regardless of the merits of the claim.251 The court
stated: "Given the central importance of this duty, our State's
attorneys cannot be allowed to evade responsibility for its care-
ful performance by the simple expedient of 'farming out' the
task to independent contractors."252
The court held that the Code of Professional Responsibility
reinforced this conclusion. 253 Under the Code, a lawyer may not
seek to prospectively limit liability for malpractice. 254 The Code
244. Id. at 274, 614 N.E.2d at 715, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (quoting Pacific Fire
Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn. 1937)).
245. This may not truly be an example of vicarious liability because this really
is the employer's negligence. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 274 n.1, 614 N.E.2d at 715
n.1, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 152 n.1. See supra part II.B.1.
246. See supra part II.B.3.
247. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 274, 614 N.E.2d at 715, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 152. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965); see also supra part II.B.2.
248. 81 N.Y.2d at 274, 614 N.E.2d at 715, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153. A nondelega-
ble duty is "one that 'requires the person upon whom it is imposed to answer for it
that care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent contractor, to
whom the performance of the duty is entrusted.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS, Ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, at 394 (1965)).
249. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 275, 614 N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.31(a) (1986) ("A lawyer shall
not seek, by contract or other means, to limit prospectively the lawyer's individual
liability to a client for malpractice ...").
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also forbids a lawyer from neglecting legal matters entrusted to
him or her.25 5 Noting that a common practice among attorneys
may be unknown to the general public,256 the court found addi-
tional support for its decision in the average client's perception
that the tasks associated with commencing a lawsuit are per-
formed by the attorney or someone under the attorney's
direction.257
The court discussed additional policy reasons for imposing
liability. Attorneys are licensed with the understanding that
they have specialized knowledge and the character to represent
clients in a responsible manner. 258 Judge Titone noted that the
responsibility for achieving proper service "must remain
squarely on the shoulders of trained and licensed attorneys
who, as members of a 'learned profession,' alone have the neces-
sary knowledge and experience to protect their clients'
rights." 259
2. Concurring Opinion of Judge Bellacosa
Judge Titone was explicit in noting that the majority's hold-
ing was a narrow one.2 6° Judge Bellacosa, however, although
concurring in the result, wrote a separate opinion. In his opin-
ion, Judge Bellacosa stated that he would have rested the deci-
sion on the defendant's alleged negligence in choosing a process
server and in failing to obtain the automatic sixty-day extension
under CPLR section 203(b)(5). 261 In Judge Bellacosa's opinion,
selecting an incompetent process server, given Fischer's "repu-
tation for poor and sloppy service,"26 2 was adequate grounds for
imposing liability. Additionally, Judge Bellacosa stated that
255. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.30(a)(3) (1986) ("A lawyer
shall not... neglect a matter entrusted to the lawyer.").
256. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 276, 614 N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
257. Id. See also supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 277, 614 N.E.2d at 717, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 279, 614 N.E.2d at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (Bellacosa, J., concur-
ring). See supra notes 199, 222. Judge Bellacosa adopted the view of Justice Ro-
senberger that a question of fact existed as to the defendant's negligence without
imputing liability from the process server. See supra part III.C.2.
262. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 279, 614 N.E.2d at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
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the failure to act under section 203(b)(5) raised a question of
fact sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.263
Judge Bellacosa was uncomfortable with the court's classi-
fication of service of process as a nondelegable duty of the attor-
ney because it "open[ed] up an unrealistic and undue liability
channel not only with respect to the relationship of attorneys to
process servers but, by analogous extension, also to many other
relationships in which attorneys retain specialists and experts
in the discharge of their professional obligations to cients."264
He stated that the new rule "contradict[ed] the justification and
practicality for the long-standing practice of utilizing and rely-
ing on independent process servers. For practical purposes, it
will compel attorneys to assume the role of process servers
themselves."2 5 Because Judge Bellacosa felt the ordinary ques-
tion-of-fact path was available, he saw no justification for ex-
panding this rule.26 In addition, he noted that this holding
conflicted with lower courts and other states that classify
outside process servers as independent contractors. 267
IV. Analysis
Every time an appellate court decides a case, it must con-
sider the impact its decision will have on the entire body of ex-
isting law and on future cases. This is a huge responsibility and
one that should not be taken lightly. The New York Court of
Appeals seems to have forgotten this when it decided Kleeman
v. Rheingold.268 The opinion was based on broader principles
than necessary to settle the dispute before the court. Rather
than simply finding the particular defendant in the case negli-
gent, the Court of Appeals created a new nondelegable duty.269
The court justified its decision with rules of professional respon-
sibility and public policy.270 Having an attorney responsible for
ensuring proper service of process will result in accountability
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 280, 614 N.E.2d at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
267. Id. at 280, 614 N.E.2d at 719, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
268. 81 N.Y.2d 270, 614 N.E.2d 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1993).
269. Id. at 275, 614 N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
270. Id. at 275-77, 614 N.E.2d at 716-17, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153-54.
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and more conscientious lawyering. However, the court should
have rested its decision on more narrow principles of ordinary
negligence, thereby limiting its ruling to the dispute before it.
Moreover, the court failed to address relevant precedent 271 and
improperly used the Code of Professional Responsibility as a ba-
sis for the imposition of civil liability.2 72
A. Broader than Necessary
"This case [would have been] more prudently resolved on
the narrower ground that questions of fact exist[ed] as to
whether the defendant law firm was negligent in choosing its
process server and in failing to obtain an automatic 60-day ex-
tension under CPLR 203(b)(5)."273 The Kleeman case was based
on a summary judgment motion.274 Plaintiff's bill of particulars
alleged that the defendant law firm was guilty of malpractice
for failure to commence the action in a timely manner and fail-
ure to properly supervise the process server.275 The plaintiff
could have prevailed by showing that a reasonable attorney
would have filed the summons and complaint with the county
clerk, thereby extending the statute of limitations for sixty
days.276 Although Dr. Laursen did not raise his defense until
after the sixty day extension would have run,277 an issue of fact
remained as to whether the attorney was negligent in failing to
file for the extension. If the extension had been obtained, the
process server may have acted less hastily in serving the physi-
271. See supra part II.C.2.
272. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
273. Kieeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 279, 614 N.E.2d at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (Bel-
lacosa, J., concurring).
Under current law, see supra note 199, there is an even stronger argument
that the law firm was negligent in not filing the summons and complaint with the
county clerk. Had they fied with the clerk, they would have stopped the statute of
limitations and received an extra 120 days to file proof of service on the defendant.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 306-b (McKinney Supp. 1995).
274. Id. at 272, 614 N.E.2d at 714, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 151. A motion for sum-
mary judgment must be denied if a party shows facts sufficient to require trial of
any issue of fact. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3212(b) (McKinney 1992).
275. Kleeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 854-55, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
276. N.Y. CIv. Puc. L. & R. 203(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1995). This statute
provides for an automatic 60 day extension of the statute of limitations if the sum-
mons is delivered to the sheriff or filed with the county clerk. See supra note 222.
277. Kieeman, 148 Misc. 2d at 854, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (the defense was
raised in February).
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cian and may have waited for the physician himself rather than
leaving the papers with the secretary.
The defendant in Kleeman did not take any precautions de-
spite his knowledge that the statute of limitations was about to
expire. 278 This should have influenced the court when deciding
whether an issue of material fact existed.279 Proper service of
process is essential to the commencement of a lawsuit. Without
it, even a meritorious claim will go unheard and the client will
be left without a remedy.2  A lawyer who neglects his duty to
assure proper service of process is not living up to his duty and
should be subject to liability in a malpractice suit.
Plaintiff brought forth evidence that Fischer had a reputa-
tion for sloppy service. 281 As Judge Bellacosa of the New York
Court of Appeals and Justices Milonas and Rosenberger of the
Appellate Division remarked, the court could have rested its de-
cision on the defendant's own negligence in selecting an incom-
petent process server rather than creating a nondelegable
duty.2s 2 All the court had to find was that there was a triable
issue of fact.2 There definitely was. However, the court did
not just settle the dispute before it. Instead, the court created a
new nondelegable duty that lawyers must ensure proper
service. 284
B. Professional Responsibility Justifications
The court also acted improperly by relying on the Code of
Professional Conduct to impose civil liability. 285 The Rules of
278. Id. However, the defendant did advise the process service bureau that
service had to be made immediately. Id.
279. Summary judgment can be granted only if "no material and triable issue
of fact is presented." Wanger v. Zeh, 45 Misc. 2d 93, 94, 256 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965), aff'd, 26 A.D.2d 729 (3d Dep't 1966).
280. Service is a necessary part of personal jurisdiction and "[a] judgment ob-
tained in the absence of jurisdiction is void.' OscAR G. CHASE & ROBERT A.
BARKER, CIVIL LrIIGATION IN NEw YORK 171 (2d ed. 1990).
281. See supra notes 209, 223 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 235, 237-39, 261-63 and accompanying text.
283. "Issue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to [summary
judgment]." Estev v. Abad, 271 A.D. 725, 727, 68 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (1st Dep't
1947) quoted in Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp, 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404,
144 N.E.2d 387, 392, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505 (1957).
284. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 278, 614 N.E.2d at 717, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
285. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
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Professional Responsibility were not intended to create civil lia-
bility.286 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed and found
justification for its decision in these rules. 28 7 The court also
failed to acknowledge the opinion of a Maryland court that ex-
pressly rejected the argument that the existence of a code of
professional conduct reflects public policy and justifies imposing
civil liability.288 As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals re-
marked in Kersten, the rules are designed to provide guidance
to lawyers and to provide structure to regulate and discipline
lawyers' conduct. 2 9 The Maryland court recognized that these
rules should not be used to impose civil liability. 290 The New
York Court of Appeals, however, failed to acknowledge that the
Rules of Professional Responsibility are intended to be only an
internal regulating mechanism for the legal profession. By us-
ing the Rules of Professional Responsibility as a basis upon
which to impose civil liability, the court forces lawyers to think
of themselves before their clients.291 Attorneys will consider the
extent of liability they are potentially exposing themselves to
rather than representing their clients' best interests, which is
what the Rules of Professional Responsibility advocate.
C. Comparison to Other Exceptions to Vicarious Liability:
Right Idea, Wrong Time
The court also acted improperly by creating the new non-
delegable duty. In doing so, the court reasoned that service of
process is like other nondelegable duties because of its impor-
286. "Note that the ABA took pains to emphasize in both the code and the
rules that neither should be used to create civil liability." STEPHEN GILLERS, REGU-
LATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 635 (1992).
287. The court relied on provisions of professional responsibility. N.Y. CoMP.
R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1200.30(a)(3), 1200.31(a) (1986). These regulations provide
that a lawyer cannot neglect matters entrusted to him and cannot limit liability
prospectively through contract.
288. Kersten v. Van Grack, Axelson & Wiliamowsky, P.C., 608 A.2d 1270,
1275-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). See supra part II.C.2 for a discussion of
Kersten.
As common practice, when there is no controlling precedent in the applicable
jurisdiction, judges and lawyers look to other jurisdictions for persuasive author-
ity, as Judge Bellacosa did. Kieeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 280, 614 N.E.2d at 280, 598
N.Y.S.2d at 156. The majority should have done the same.
289. 608 A.2d at 1275.
290. Id. at 1275-76.
291. GiLERs, supra note 286, at 611.
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tance. Nevertheless, this was not the proper case in which to
create this duty. In order to determine whether service of pro-
cess should be a nondelegable duty, one must examine its simi-
larities to and differences from other nondelegable duties.
Service of process is similar to other duties that have been held
nondelegable by the courts in that failure to perform this duty
will cause harm.292 Without proper service, a meritorious claim
will go unheard and the plaintiff will have no remedy.293 The
importance of a responsibility may also be sufficient grounds for
making it nontransferable. 294 A lawyer's duty to commence a
lawsuit is similar to other nondelegable duties because its
breach results in harm to the individual to whom the duty is
owed.
In addition, public policy suggests lawyers should be liable
for improper service.295 Clients should be able to rely on a law-
yer to carry out duties owed to them. It is in the interest of
lawyers to have the public's trust and faith. Imposing liability
forces lawyers to be more conscientious and helps to restore the
public's confidence in them.
Similarly, a major reason for holding hospitals liable for the
negligence of emergency room workers is public perception.296
When a patient comes into the emergency room of a hospital, he
is not aware of any contracts between the hospital and the doc-
tors. The same is true of clients seeking lawyers. A client
comes into a law office with little or no knowledge of how the
firm operates. He expects the lawyer to commence his law-
suit.297 He has no way of knowing that the lawyer will call a
process service agency and have them deliver the papers. In
292. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). See supra
notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
295. The public perception as well as that of the client is that all tasks associ-
ated with commencing an action, including service of process, are performed by the
attorney or someone acting under his direction. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 276, 614
N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153. Just as the public's perception of who provides
emergency room services allowed the court to impose liability in Mbuda, the cli-
ent's perception justifies imposing liability to the hospital on the attorney. See
supra notes 121-29 for a discussion of the Mbuda case. See also supra note 120
and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 121, 124-29 and accompanying text.
297. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 276, 614 N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
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addition, clients usually are in a type of emergency situation.
They need help solving a problem that they are not trained to
deal with. The public should be able to go to a lawyer and ex-
pect the lawyer to help them.
Despite the importance of proper service and the other sim-
ilarities with other nondelegable duties, it is different from
other duties that have been deemed nondelegable. 298 The harm
caused by improper service is generally financial, not physi-
cal.299 None of the cases or restatements impose vicarious lia-
bility for financial harm; it is always for physical harm.3°°
Undeniably, financial injury is often severe. Nevertheless, gen-
erally it does not rise to deserving the same protection as one
expects from physical harm. If we can impose liability on an
attorney for causing financial harm to his client, the next step
may be to allow a suit against a stockbroker if the client's stocks
do not do well. Is this really where we want the law to go?
The element of control is also lacking in the case of an in-
dependent process server. An attorney hands the summons and
complaint to a process server with the reasonable expectation
that service will be made, but has no control over the details of
service. He normally receives an affidavit stating that service
has been made. Unless the court wants attorneys to personally
assume the role of process server, the creation of this duty is
ludicrous.01
D. Policy Justifications
The Kleeman court decided that allowing attorneys to dele-
gate their duty was contrary to public policy.30 2 The state gives
lawyers the privilege of practicing law.303 With that privilege
comes the expectation of responsible fulfillment of the job. This
responsibility is justified because of the benefit lawyers receive
from being licensed by the state. If lawyers want to continue to
298. See supra part II.B.2 for a discussion of nondelegable duties.
299. The claim goes unheard if proper service is not made but there is no
physical injury to the client.
300. See supra part II.
301. See Bockian v. Esanu, Katsky, Korins & Siger, 124 Misc. 2d 607, 611,476
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (stating that it was "ludicrous"
for an attorney to be vicariously liable for the alleged bad acts of a process server).
302. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 276, 614 N.E.2d at 716, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
303. Id.
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have the privilege of practicing law, they must be willing to as-
sume the responsibilities that come along with it.
The court has very sound reasons for wanting to impose lia-
bility.30 4 Lawyers should be discouraged from "farming out"
their responsibilities. However, the outcome of this case would
have been the same regardless of the creation of a nondelegable
duty. This case did not require the court to create the new duty
to solve the dispute before it. The court went beyond settling
the controversy it faced.
The court's decision has implications for the future of New
York vicarious liability law. With the new duty in mind, law-
yers may be reluctant to hire outside process server agencies. A
big firm will be able to cover the additional cost of hiring in-
house process servers through higher rates. The big firms may
also simply choose to assume the risk of a negligent process
server and cover it with malpractice insurance. However, a sole
practitioner faces a bigger hurdle when he accepts a case if he
has to guarantee proper service of process. He may opt to hire
his own process server, if he can afford to. He could serve pro-
cess himself, or maybe the sole practitioner will take the gamble
and risk the cost of a malpractice suit. No longer can an attor-
ney rely on the affidavit of service of process. He will have to
personally verify the service. As Judge Bellacosa commented,
this contradicts the justification and practicality of relying on
independent process servers.30 5 It may also cause attorneys to
be reluctant to rely on any outside experts for fear that they will
be held liable for acts which they have no ability to prevent.
By creating another nondelegable duty based on the impor-
tance of proper service, the court took another step down the
road to abandoning the independent contractor exception en-
tirely. It has been a long process, but the trend has been to
expand liability.306 One commentator states that, "[i]t has been
noted for years that the immunity is vanishing or waning."
30 7
304. See supra part III.D.1.
305. Kleeman, 81 N.Y.2d at 279, 614 N.E.2d at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (Bel-
lacosa, J., concurring).
306. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, at
395 (1965).
307. 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 73, § 26.11, at 77 n.33.
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The independent contractor exception is losing support.308 The
New York Court of Appeals has set a precedent that will enable
the courts of New York to impose liability for every obligation
that they deem important.
V. Conclusion
Had the New York Court of Appeals decided Kleeman v.
Rheingold based on the narrow issue before it, lawyers would be
able to concentrate on lawyering rather than on who they hire
as process servers. A process server delivered a summons and
complaint to a secretary rather than the defendant. Because of
this "small mistake," the New York Court of Appeals decided to
impose complete responsibility for service of process on attor-
neys. This duty may not only cause lawyers to discontinue the
practice of hiring independent process servers but it will force
lawyers to take time away from doing the work they were
trained to do in order to insure that proper service of process is
made. Lawyers who hire independent process servers will be
subjecting themselves to liability for negligence they cannot
prevent. This decision "will compel attorneys to assume the
role of process servers themselves,"30 9 a role that attorneys
should not be playing.
The Kleeman court took another strike at the independent
contractor exception to vicarious liability. Not only will this rul-
ing impact on lawyers and process servers, but it will provide
support for courts to impose additional liability on the so-called
deep-pockets of the world. Individuals need to take responsibil-
ity for their own actions and not put liability on others. Maybe
Mrs. Kleeman should have gone to an attorney sooner, rather
than waiting nearly two and one-half years. Maybe the law
firm should have been more careful about who they hired to de-
liver the summons and complaint. Maybe the New York Court
of Appeals should have decided this case based on the legal is-
sue of whether a question-of-fact existed. Whatever should
308. Of late, there has been a growing tendency to look upon the independent
contractor exception "with disfavor, as little more than a sham, a mere lawyer's
device, conceived in sin and brought forth to provide undeserved immunity." Stef-
fen, supra note 73, at 501.
309. 81 N.Y.2d at 279, 614 N.E.2d at 718, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring).
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have been done by Mrs. Kleeman or by the defendant law firm
or by the New York Court of Appeals was not done. Now we
have to deal with this new nondelegable duty. Perhaps it will
cause lawyers to be the first to assume full responsibility for
their own (and for some others') actions.
Barbara S. Goldstein*
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, Marvin and Harriette, for their con-
tinued support and encouragement.
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